In this paper we study the eects of high-tech capital, foreign direct investment ows and outsourcing on demand for labor dierentiated by educational attainment levels in the manufacturing industries for two groups of countries over the period 1995-2004. These two groups of countries comprise Western and Eastern European countries respectively which are assumed to be dierently aected by the European integration process. Using detailed trade data as a basis for measuring outsourcing we further distinguish the eects of trade and outsourcing on relative wages by dierent groups of partner countries. This allows to study the eects of 'inward' outsourcing and foreign direct investment ows to Central and Eastern European countries (which became quite important in this time) in the Western European countries and -conversely -to study the eects of 'outward' outsourcing and the increase in inward FDI stocks in the Central and Eastern European countries separately.
Introduction
The changing patterns of relative demand for skills and for workers dierentiated by level of educational attainment have attracted a lot of attention in recent years and the debate is far from closed. Changes in relative demand for workers with a high level of education (and to a lesser extent for those with a medium level of education) have been observed either in terms of rising employment shares and/or in terms of rising skill premia. In the literature various causes are discussed for explaining these trends. First, increased competition with low-income countries was a matter of concern. This was triggered o in the US by the NAFTA agreement and the resulting trade liberalization with Mexico as a low income neighboring country. In Europe the debate started when the Central and Eastern European countries were integrated into the European division of labor after their transitional recessions. Similarly to the US, Western European countries were facing competition from neighboring low-income countries; dierently however from the US-Mexico case these countries were generally well endowed with skilled labor and could also build on a strong manufacturing base. Despite these facts the fear was that trade integration with the Central and Eastern European economies would lead to a relative decrease of demand for low-skill workers in the West due to imports of low-skill intensive nal products and outsourcing (i.e. imports of intermediate products) of low-skill intensive production stages.
Important studies analyzing the employment eects of these developments are summarized in Section 2. There is however much less literature studying the eects on low-income countries, in particular the Central and Eastern European countries. This is somewhat surprising as nal goods imports and 'inward outsourcing', i.e. imports of intermediates from the viewpoint of the Western European economies, have its counterparts as nal goods exports and 'outward outsourcing', i.e. the exports of these intermediate products, from the viewpoint of the lowerincome Central and Eastern European economies. 1 To our knowledge there is no attempt in the literature to study the eects of the fragmentation of production for both types of economies in Europe simultaneously drawing on the same database. 2 This will be the main challenge in this paper.
Similar arguments hold for the eects of foreign direct investment (FDI). Whereas for the
Central and Eastern European countries it is mainly the eects of inward FDI on employment that 1 In this sense we refer to 'outsourcing' as international outsourcing, i.e. international fragmentation of production. 'Inward outsourcing' then means the purchase of intermediate products from abroad (imports) whereas 'outward outsourcing' means the selling of intermediate products abroad (exports) .
2 However, evidence on employment eects on both the US and Mexico do exist. There is also some literature pointing towards common trends of rising skill premia in both high and low income countries.
should matter, it was the eects of outward FDI from the viewpoint of the Western economies which was the subject of greater attention. Thus we also include measures for outward and inward FDI stocks in our specications.
A second main cause for the rising relative demand for skilled workers and the rising skill premia have been seen in the eects of skill-biased technical change driven by capital-skill complementarity and the impact of ICT capital on relative demand patterns. In our empirical work we thus also include capital measures to control for these eects.
In this paper we therefore analyze the eects of (high-tech) capital, FDI ows and fragmentation of production on employment patterns in the Western and Eastern European countries.
The rst group of countries is seen as being characterized by outward foreign direct investment (i.e. investing abroad where one of the most important target regions in this period have been the Central and Eastern European countries) and 'inward outsourcing'. On the opposite side, the latter group of countries is mainly seen as being the recipient of foreign direct investment (i.e.
the importance of inward FDI is a matter of concern) and being the exporters of intermediate products ('outward outsourcing') . This distinction will be taken into account in the particular econometric specications for both types of economies.
The paper is structured as follows. We proceed with a short survey of the theoretical and empirical literature. Then we give a short discussion of the data we use and the econometric specications we have chosen. Sections 4 and 5 then report some results for the group of Western and Eastern European countries respectively. Section 6 concludes.
Survey of the literature
Following the political debate on the fear that globalization would cause job losses in the advanced economies, the issue of outsourcing started to gain importance in the theoretical literature at the begin of the 1990s, with the seminal contribution of Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) . They argue that international outsourcing increased in the recent years thanks to the technological development of service activities linking production processes taking place in dierent countries.
The eects of the fragmentation of production on factor prices have been investigated theoretically in a variety of models. This has shown that the expected eects depend very much on specic assumptions on the relative factor intensity of the outsourced production stage, the sector in which outsourcing takes place, etc. Further, the eects depend very much on whether one takes a general equilibrium approach as opposed to analyzing the eects for a single industry.
For example Arndt (1997) uses a 2 × 2 × 2 Heckscher-Ohlin framework and shows that in the typical situation, in which both the skill-abundant and the skill-scarce country engage in reciprocal outsourcing of the fragment using the scarce factor relatively more intensively, this leads to an increase in both wages and employment of unskilled workers in comparison with skilled labor. 3
This simple result is, in any case, at odds with the empirical evidence of rising skill premium and skill intensity in both skill and unskilled labor-abundant countries.
A number of papers analyzed fragmentation in a more general framework (see Deardor, 1998 Deardor, , 2001 Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001; Kohler, 2001 Kohler, , 2004 . Deardor (2001) shows that cost-saving fragmentation occurs only when countries lie on dierent "cones of diversication", exploiting factor price dierences due to lack of factor price equalization. In a dierent work the same author argues that fragmentation can foster factor price equalization (Deardor, 1998) . Hence, there is no clear direction of change in factor prices when countries engage in outsourcing. The direction of the eect depends on the interplay between the factor intensities in the overall production of the two countries and on that of the industry fragmenting the production (see also Kohler, 2001 Kohler, , 2004 , for discussion based on specic-factors model). In general, eects on the relative factor prices may emerge when the dierence between the skill intensity of the outsourced fragment and a country's average skill intensity is high. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) use a model with a single good produced with a continuum of stages with dierent skill intensities to show the eect of FDI on the skill premium of both sourcing and outsourcing countries. In this context, outsourcing from a skill-abundant country via FDI can induce a skill-biased eect on the production of the receiving country even when the outsourced fragment is labor intensive. The skill-biased eect will take place when the average skill intensity of the receiving country is lower than that of the outsourced fragment. The authors then provide empirical evidence of the skill-biased impact of FDI in the case of Mexico's maquilladoras.
The issue of outsourcing has been more deeply investigated by the same authors in Feenstra and Hanson (1999) , where the authors develop a two-stage econometric procedure for endogenizing TFP and estimate the impact of outsourcing on the skill premium. Further, they develop two measures of outsourcing which has become the main reference for empirical works on the subject: narrow outsourcing, dened as the sum of imported intermediate inputs in one industry from the same industry, and broad outsourcing, which considers imported inputs purchased in one industry from all industries. Within this framework they nd that outsourcing explains between 15%
and 40% of the increase in the relative wage of non-production workers, while high-technology capital explains between 35% and 70%.
Following the contribution by Feenstra and Hanson (1997) empirical work has focused on the skill-biased impact of outsourcing on both old and new members of the European Union. In the rst group the most relevant studies concentrate on larger countries, especially the UK (Anderson and Brenton, 1999; Hijzen, 2007; Hijzen et al., 2005) and Germany (Helg and Tajoli, 2005; Geishecker, 2006) or bordering countries like Austria (Lorentowicz et al., 2005; Marin, 2004) . Hijzen (2007) and Hijzen et al. (2005) investigate the impact of outsourcing and technological change on the skill structure of both wages and employment in the British manufacturing. Hijzen (2007) estimates the impact on wages by applying the narrow and broad measure of outsourcing dened above and by separating the factor-bias eect from that of the sector bias. The result is that for wages both skill-biased technical change and outsourcing increased inequalities by reducing the wage of unskilled workers, but the eect of the latter is lower. Further, the sectorbias impact of outsourcing is 3.5 times higher than its factor-bias impact. Similar results arise for the labor demand eect (Hijzen et al., 2005) , with narrow outsourcing driving down the demand for unskilled labor and R&D increasing the demand for skills. Hence, both factors contributed substantially to the skill upgrading in British industry. Helg and Tajoli (2005) investigate the impact of outward processing on both relative employment and relative wages of skilled workers in Italy and Germany. Their main nding is that international outsourcing contributed signicantly to the increase of the skilled to unskilled labor ratio in Italy, but not in Germany. According to the authors, this puzzling result is due to the specialization of Italy into traditional low-skill-intensive industries, while in Germany the industries most engaged in fragmentation have a higher skill intensity. Hence, in the former the dierence in factor intensity between the outsourced fragment and the country's average is higher, causing a strong impact on labor demand, while in Germany the factor intensities of the domestic and outsourced productions are similar, causing little or no labor demand eects. 4 A recent analysis by Geishecker (2006) on the German case came to dierent conclusions. Specically, the author's nding is that outsourcing to CEECs contributed signicantly to the reduction of the relative demand for unskilled labor, while total outsourcing had a much lower impact. The dierence between the two results lies mainly in the separation between outsourcing to CEECs and outsourcing to the rest of the World, with the former accounting for most of the impact.
Nevertheless, problems with the specication and the econometrics probably inuenced the results. In his regressions Geishecker uses both the broad and narrow measures of outsourcing as suggested by Feenstra and Hanson, while Helg and Tajoli consider only trade in intermediate inputs collected from the Eurostat COMEXT database. In addition, the former addresses the problem of endogeneity of the outsourcing measures, which is likely to return biased estimates due to inconsistency, hence the results of Geishecker are more reliable, both in terms of specication and in terms of the estimation procedure. In Austria, the outsourcing process worked in a way similar to the Italian case. Recent studies (Lorentowicz et al., 2005; Marin, 2004 Marin, , 2006 provide evidence that Austria is specializing in low-skill stages of the production chain while outsourcing high-skill production stages, reducing as a consequence the share of skilled labor in production costs.
Considering Eastern European countries, the majority of the studies investigated the impact 4 A similar results with a dierent methodology is that of Marin (2004) .
of FDI on the relative demand for skilled labor proxied by non-manual workers (Bruno et al., 2004; Lorentowicz et al., 2005; Skuratowicz, 2001; Kertesi and Köllö, 2002) . Due to the lack of data, most of the studies use a panel of industries and document a skill-biased impact of foreign capital in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (see Kertesi and Köllö, 2002; Bruno et al., 2004; Lorentowicz et al., 2005 ). An exception to this methodology is the paper of Skuratowicz (2001) which uses regional data for Poland and nds that FDI increases the skill premium within each region but exacerbates dierences between regions, increasing the geographical polarization of inequalities. Lacking data from input-output tables, the outsourcing process has been specically investigated in a number of papers by using trade in intermediates as proxy for it (Egger and Stehrer, 2003; Egger, 2006; Geishecker, 2004; Kaminski and Ng, 2005; Marin, 2006; Esposito, 2007) . What comes out from these contributions is that in the early stages of the transition process outsourcing from Western to Eastern Europe induced the latter group of countries to specialize in the production and export of unskilled labor-intensive intermediates (Egger and Stehrer, 2003) and in assembling activities (Kaminski and Ng, 2005) . In particular (Egger and Stehrer, 2003 ) using a panel of 3 countries and 14 industries found that both importing and exporting of intermediates move the wage-bill-ratio in favor of manual workers. The latter impact is stronger for intermediate exports, suggesting a relative specialization in elementary goods from raw materials. With the same data Egger (2006) found that outsourcing fostered a factor-price equalization among Central and Eastern European industries with the variation of wages being reduced more strongly among skilled workers than among unskilled workers.
From the end of the 1990s, as found by Kaminski and Ng (2005) , the New Member States' integration into the EU-based network of production increased enormously and changed the countries' specialization towards the production and export of parts and other outsourcingrelated products. Recent studies on outsourcing and demand for skilled and unskilled labor in Central and Eastern European countries report both skilled-and unskilled-biased impacts of intermediate goods trade (Geishecker, 2004; Esposito, 2007) . Geishecker (2004) and inward outsourcing to high-income countries.
In the specication for Western European countries we include both inward and outward FDI stock because we assume that these countries delocalize production stages to low-income countries via foreign direct investment ows and that, at the same time, they receive FDI from other high-income countries both for delocalization and for market-seeking purposes. However, the Central and Eastern European countries have mainly been targeted for delocalization from advanced (and mainly Western European) countries while their investment abroad is of very low importance over this period. Hence for this second group we include only the inward FDI stock.
For both kor and kict we expect to have a skill-biased eect, therefore we should expect these variables to impact positively on the high skilled or negatively on the low-skilled. By the same token a similar impact is expected for FDI (f diis) in Central and Eastern European countries if FDI is mainly cost-driven. Further, if high-income countries delocalize unskilled labor intensive stages of production, a similar impact should be expected for the outward FDI stock (f dios) in this group.
Turning to the outsourcing variables, we should expect, if anything, a skill-favoring impact of both inward and outward outsourcing in the Western European countries. The reason for this is that inward outsourcing replaces unskilled workers whereas outward outsourcing is in favor of skilled workers. For the Central and Eastern European countries, both the theoretical literature and the former empirical results (see Egger and Stehrer, 2003; Esposito, 2007, for example) would suggest that exported intermediates to high-income countries should favor unskilled labor.
Previous evidence is mixed for the impact of intermediate imports in these countries; we therefore do not make any a priori assumption on their impact.
Concerning the econometric procedure, the use of a dynamic panel specication is justied by the presence of adjustment costs in labor demand and by the presence of serial correlation in the residuals from a static regression. Because of the availability of FDI data we have an unbalanced panel of industries and countries for the years 1996 to 2004, which is a relatively short time span. Accordingly, for the estimation procedure, we use a System General Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator, which solves the endogeneity problem in dynamic panels by using both a level and dierence equation and by instrumenting the endogenous variable with its lagged levels in the dierence equation and using lagged dierences for the equation in levels (see Arellano and Bover, 1995) . This procedure is particularly suited for short, persistent panels and is more ecient than a dierence GMM à la Arellano and Bond (Arellano and Bond, 1991) because in the latter, the lagged levels are in general weak instruments. The choice of the instruments and the other econometric details are discussed separately for each group of countries to which we turn in the following sections.
Results for Western European countries
For the sample of Western European countries we estimated equation (3.1) by adding a full set of time dummies. The presence of serial correlation and the rejection of both the Sargan and
Hansen tests forced us to use the lagged levels of the outsourcing measures as internal instruments for the levels equation only. Additional instruments are a time trend and the second lag of value added, which we treat as exogenous. For the equation in rst-dierences we used the third and fourth lag of the dependent variable, collapsed into a vector, and lags four and ve of the capital and FDI measures. For the regression on the low-skilled we excluded from the instruments both value added and the time trend. Further, we used lags two and three of the FDI measures and only lag three of the capital measures. In the specications we also allowed for a small sample correction (see Windmeijer, 2005) . Results are reported in Tables 1 to 3 . These specications with respect to the outsourcing measure (i.e. imported intermediate inputs) used (see above).
With these instruments the overidentifying restriction are valid and there is no second order serial correlation.
In all three specication there is a high and signicant persistence with the lagged dependent variable being 0.85 for both medium-and low-educated, while for the high-educated it is 0.52. The capital-output ratio is positive and signicant at 5% for the high-educated in specications 1 and 2. In these cases the capital stock exerts a negative, but signicant only at 10% level, on the medium-educated. The coecient is extremely high, above 0.3, implying a long run impact of a 1% increase in the capital output ratio of -2.3 for the medium-educated and 0.7 for the high-educated. The share of ICT capital has no eect on the wage bill shares (it is positive and signicant at the 10% level for the low-educated in the third specication only).
The outward FDI stock exerts a negative and highly signicant impact on the low-educated and positive, although only signicant at 10% level, for the medium-educated. There is no signicant eect on the wage bill share of the high-educated persons. With respect to the FDI inward stock in the Western European economies there was no eect whatsoever. According to Table 1 a 10% increase in the outward-FDI-to-output ratio reduces the wage bill share of the low-educated by 0.42% and raises that of the medium-educated by 0.35%. The long-run eect of the same increase in FDI, given by α i /1 − ρ, is -2.82 and 2.38 respectively.
Next let us turn to the measures of outsourcing. The share of intermediates imports to lowwage countries in output (Table 1 and in intermediate inputs to low-wage countries (Table 2 are negative and signicant for both the high-and low-educated. In both cases the result is moreor-less conrmed in the three specications although in the last specication (Table 3) Summing up, the results for Western European countries are more or less in line with the theoretical predictions. The capital-output ratio requires more high-skilled workers and less medium-skilled ones thus implying a capital-skill complementarity. However we could not nd a signicant eect of the share of ICT capital. The eects of the outward FDI is to increase the relative demand for the medium-educated domestically, while reducing the relative demand for the low-educated. This eect is amplied by the imported intermediates from low-income countries implying less high-and low-skilled labor to the advantage of the medium-skilled. This suggests that outsourcing to low-income countries consists of low-skill-intensive stages of production which allows Western European countries to rise the average skill level of domestic production.
Results for Central and Eastern European countries
The results for the Central and Eastern European countries using specication (3.2) are shown
in Tables 4 to 6 . The equation has been estimated using lags from three to ve of the dependent variable and of kict; furthermore we used lags from three to six for kout and f diis. All these instruments are collapsed into a single vector in order to save degrees of freedom and avoid over-identication problems. For the same reason we did not introduce the time dummies in the regression. Additional instruments are the inward and outward outsourcing measures and a set of time dummies. The former variables are assumed to be predetermined, hence they are valid instruments only for the equation in levels, while time dummies are exogenous and introduced in both equations. The other variables keep their signs and signicance among the three specication, hence we refer only to the results of the specication reported in Table 4 for interpretation. The impact of the lagged dependent variable reveals a high persistence of the series, having a impact between 0.8 and 0.9 on both high and medium skilled and 0.6 on the low skilled. 8
The capital-output ratio always has a positive impact, although it is signicant and (relatively) strong only for the medium-skilled. In that group the impact of a 1% increase in the capital-output ratio is 0.05 in the short-run and 0.4 in the long-run, suggesting a strong complementarity between capital and medium-skilled labor. (Note that these medium-skilled workers include a number of technicians and related occupations.) The share of ICT capital has a positive impact too, but it is never signicant.
The FDI inward stock in these countries exerts a signicant impact on all three groups, with a positive impact on high-skilled workers and a negative one on both medium-and low-skilled. This is consistent with the assumption of a skill-biased impact of FDI in low-income countries. A 1% increase in the FDI-to-output ratio raises the wage bill share of the high-educated by 0.09% while reducing that of the medium-and low-educated by 0.15% and 0.16% respectively. The long-run eects of the same increase are, in the same order, 0.5, 1.4 and 0.4.
Finally, the export of intermediates to high-income countries (i.e. the imports of intermediates of the high-income countries) has a strong and positive impact on both the medium-and the low-skilled. In any case, for the latter group this variable is signicant at the 5% level only in specication 3 (see Table 6 ). The short-run impact is above 0.8 for the medium-skilled and almost 0.95 for the low-skilled. This means that the long-run impact is 7.72 for the medium-skilled and 2.33 for the low-skilled.
In conclusion, the picture that arises from the estimations is pretty much in line with theoretical assumptions also for Central and Eastern European countries: FDI exerts a skill-biased impact by increasing the share of the high-skilled, and consequentially reducing those of other workers. The total capital stock favors the medium-skilled, which can mean that capital equipments require only particular skills mainly held by medium-educated workers, while a high education is required for foreign capital. The outsourcing process partially conrms the result from other studies, with a positive eect on the medium-and low-educated, suggesting a specialization into relatively low-skill-intensive products.
Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the eects of high-tech capital, FDI ows and outsourcing on the wage bill shares in two groups of countries. These two groups are the Western European countries which are mainly seen as investors in the Eastern European countries (the second group) and importers of intermediate inputs. On the other hand, the second group consisting of Eastern European countries is mainly characterized by inows of foreign direct investment and exports of intermediates. Our results are largely in line with prior expectations: In the Western European economies the FDI outward stock and imports of intermediates have negative eects on the wage bill share of the low-educated workers whereas FDI inward stocks and exports of intermediates have no signicant eects at all. Surprisingly however, imports of intermediates also have a negative eect on the wage bill share of high-educated workers. This might be explained by a shift towards medium-educated workers. For the Eastern European countries the FDI inward stock shows negative eects on the wage bill share of medium-and low-educated workers and signicantly positive eects for the high-educated workers. The exports of intermediates (note that these are mainly the imports of intermediates of the advanced Western European economies)
show a positive eect on the wage bill share of the medium-and low-educated which relates to the expected pattern of specialization. An increase in capital services relative to output mainly favors high-and medium-educated workers in Western Europe and medium-educated workers in Central and Eastern Europe. We could not however nd an additional eect of the share of ICT capital services in total capital services. Finally, the paper also points towards some problems with respect to measuring outsourcing and sensitivity of the results with regard to econometric specications. This provides scope for future research.
